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This study examines the dynamic relationships among farm real estate values, farm returns, 
farm program payments, and real interest rates in an income capitalization model. 
Endogeneity is assumed among the variables in a dynamic framework because the 
direction of causality is unclear from a theoretical standpoint. The analysis encompasses 
the period beginning with the introduction of the first farm bill in 1933 and ending in 
2006. Results indicate farm program payments have positive direct impacts in the short 
run and positive indirect impacts (via farm returns) in the long run on farm real estate 
values. 
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Agricultural policies and farm program payments in the United States may be driven by a 
desire to stabilize or increase farm incomes, production, and agricultural prices, but these 
policies also have important consequences for the structure of U.S. agriculture (e.g., Gardner, 
1987, 1990, 1992; Hennessy, 1998; Miljkovic, 2004; Miljkovic, Jin, and Paul, 2008; Shaik 
and Helmers, 2006; Sumner, 2003). The general structure of U.S. agricultural policies stabil-
izes farm income when producers experience production shortfalls by providing payments 
under commodity programs, disaster payments, crop insurance, and other farm programs.
1 
  Using farm-level, state, or national data, some studies have concluded that farm program 
payments are capitalized into farm real estate values. However, previous research suffers 
from two limitations. First, models of farm program payment effects have not addressed 
identification issues between farm receipts and farm program payments (Shaik, Atwood, and 
Helmers, 2005; Goodwin, Mishra, and Ortalo-Magne, 2003). Second, studies examining the 
importance of farm program payments in a static framework fail to address the short-run and 
long-run dynamics of farm program payments and traditional variables on farm real estate 
values. 
  Accordingly, the objective of this study is to examine the short-run and long-run dynamic 
relationships among farm real estate values, farm returns, farm program payments, and real 
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capitalization model using U.S. aggregate data.
2 The analysis covers the period from the intro- 
duction of the first farm bill in 1933 through 2006. We address endogeneity issues among 
farm real estate values, farm program payments, and farm receipts in a dynamic modeling 
framework. 
  Certainly, additional variables also affect regional or local farm land values. For example, 
the impacts of urban development on rural-urban fringes influence the value of 3%–4% of 
agricultural land. Similarly, alternative farm land uses (e.g., recreation or hunting) can influ-
ence farm land values in certain regions. However, the four variables identified in our research 
are the primary factors that impact most of the 932 million acres of U.S. farm land. 
 
Review of Literature 
on Farm Real Estate Values 
 
Previous research on farm real estate assets has generally focused on factors affecting land 
values in the 1980s and 1990s. These empirical analyses were based on income capitalization 
models and emphasized the capitalization of expected long-run changes in farm returns into 
agricultural land values. The impacts of inflation, debt financing, and financial speculation 
received considerable attention as farm land values increased rapidly during the late 1970s, 
followed by a significant decline in values after 1981. 
  Models developed to explain changes in farm land values include income capitalization 
models (e.g., Alston, 1986; Burt, 1986), hedonic models (Palmquist and Danielson, 1989; 
Shonkwiler and Reynolds, 1986; Xu, Mittelhammer, and Barkley, 1993), urban-rural 
expansion using nonfarm factors (e.g., Shi, Phipps, and Colyer, 1997; Plantinga and Miller, 
2001), and urban and environmental influences on land values (Freeman, 1974; Gardner and 
Barrows, 1985; Miranowski and Hammes, 1984). Featherstone and Baker (1987) examined 
the simultaneous impact of farm real estate values, real interest rates, and farm returns using 
U.S. data from 1910–1985 in a vector autoregressive regression framework. Using land 
values and differences between value of land and rents as endogenous variables, Falk (1991) 
found that farm land price and rents are highly correlated. In addition, land price movements 
were found to be inconsistent with the income capitalization model. Falk also argued that 
farm land values were not cointegrated with agricultural returns because of changes in farm 
land discount rates over time. 
  Previous research relies on the income capitalization model in which farm factors affecting 
net returns are used in conjunction with other exogenous variables including real interest 
rates, inflation, and rents (Just and Miranowski, 1993). Recent literature on farm land values 
has focused on the effect of government payments. In the last two decades, studies of govern-
ment payment impacts have also included those of specific crops and specific programs 
(Goodwin and Ortalo-Magne, 1992; Vantreese, Reed, and Skees, 1989). Payments linked to 
program bases and resulting impacts on agricultural land values were examined by Duffy et 
al. (1994). The effect of eliminating government payments on agricultural land values was 
analyzed by Barnard et al. (2001). Their county-level, cross-sectional examination of govern-
ment payment effects on land values used data from the U.S. Department of Agriculture’s 
2000 Agricultural Resource Management Survey (ARMS). Based on their analysis of
  eight 
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the United States. Data limitations associated with state-level crop insurance and disaster payments since 1933 prohibit a regional 
analysis. Shaik and Miljkovic  Farm Real Estate Values and Farm Program Payments   155 
 
U.S. agriculture production regions, eliminating government programs would reduce agricul-
tural land values by 12% to 69%. Weersink et al. (1999) and Gardner (1987) found that 
government payments increased agricultural land values. Goodwin, Mishra, and Ortalo-
Magne (2003) and Lence and Mishra (2003) concluded that government payments positively 
affected cash rents. 
  Shaik, Helmers, and Atwood (2005) noted that earlier studies may suffer from identifica-
tion issues due to countercyclical farm program payments and farm returns. Identification 
problems occur because of the misuse of farm program payments as exogenous variables in 
land valuation models. To overcome this problem, the authors analyzed the contribution of 
farm program payments and crop returns to agricultural land values using a recursive-
simultaneous equation model. They concluded that farm program payments and crop receipts 
represented 30% and 70% of agricultural land values, respectively.
3 Furthermore, they found 
that the contribution of farm program payments to land values declined from a high of 30%–
40% during the 1938–1980 period to about 15%–20% in subsequent farm bill periods. Using 
regional data from 1938–2005, Shaik, Helmers, and Atwood (2006) found that farm program 
payments were directly related to farm real estate values. Shaik (2007) reported similar results 
using four alternative panel estimators. 
 
Specification of Income Capitalization 
and Vector Autoregressive Model 
To address the short-run and long-run dynamics of farm program payments and other variables 
on farm real estate values, we use a VAR procedure in conjunction with the income capital-
ization model. A standard approach to determining an asset’s value is to use an infinite life 
capitalization equation: 
( 1 )                / , VA r   
where V is the present value of an asset or, in this case, farm real estate value; A is the annual 
return; and r is the discount rate or, in this case, the real interest rate.
4 The returns to an asset 
can be decomposed into farm returns (x) generated by the asset and farm program payments 
(z). The capitalization model can be extended to explicitly incorporate individual components 
of expected farm returns and farm program payments as: 
( 2 )                    ( , ) / . VA x zr   
  This model could be implemented in a static framework. However, such an approach 
usually assumes farm returns, farm program payments, and real interest rates are exogenous 
to farm real estate values. While land capitalization models typically ignore farm program 
payment endogeneity, the microeconomics literature on policy evaluation or economic 
growth has long considered biases introduced by policy endogeneity (e.g., Rosenzweig and 
                                                 
3 The parameter coefficients or elasticities of the exogenous variables (when using logs) are the marginal effects, but one can 
infer this to be a contribution in terms of percentage after taking into account the expectation of the variables in a static framework. 
Shaik, Helmers, and Atwood (2005), in their appendix, have provided a detailed derivation showing why it is possible to provide 
the contribution of farm returns and farm program payments to land values in terms of percentages. 
4 The discount factor contains real interest rates and risk premia. For this study, however, we use only real interest rates due to 
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Wolpin, 1986; Rodrik, 2005). Standard solutions to endogeneity problems include instru-
mental variable estimation and randomized trials. Yet, neither of these strategies is useful 
when considering country-level impacts of farm program payments (Rodrik). The endog-
eneity of farm program payments requires an alternative modeling approach to the income 
capitalization model defined in equation (2). For example, a significant increase in farm real 
estate values may change the amount and direction of farm program payments. The dynamics 
of farm real estate values, farm returns, and farm program payments are captured by a static 
income capitalization model. 
  Alternatively, we can examine the importance of farm returns, farm program payments, 
and real interest rates on farm real estate values using vector autoregressive procedures. VAR 
models are a natural extension of univariate autoregressive models to multivariate time series. 
VAR models consider all endogenous variables in a system as functions of their lagged 
values. The income capitalization model provides some direction as to the correlation among 
variables. Such models, however, reveal little about appropriate lag structures and direction of 
causality among variables provided by VAR models. 
  The mathematical representation of a vector autoregressive model for equation (2) is given 
by: 
(3)               11 , 1 , 1 , 1 , 1 ,
11 11
22 , 2 , 2 , 2 , 2 ,
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where t is years; i = 1, …, n is the number of lags; β, γ, δ, and λ are estimated parameters 
associated with farm real estate values (V), real interest rates (r), farm returns (x), and farm 
program payments (z), respectively; and 1, 2, 3, and 4 are errors for each of the equations. 
The errors represent innovations that could be contemporaneously correlated, but uncorre-
lated with their own lagged values and all other right-hand-side variables. Since only lagged 
(exogenous) values of endogenous variables appear on the right-hand side of each equation, 
ordinary least squares estimation yields consistent estimates. Although innovations may be 
contemporaneously correlated, ordinary least squares estimates will be efficient because all 
equations have identical regressors (Enders, 1995; Hamilton, 1994). 
  The vector autoregressive approach is appropriate if the time series under consideration are 
stationary. However, the analysis in levels is inappropriate for cointegrated nonstationary 
series. A vector error correction (VEC) model is appropriate in this case because the 
endogenous variables converge to a cointegrating relationship while allowing for short-run 
adjustment dynamics. The cointegration term is called the error correction term since devia-
tions from long-run equilibrium are gradually corrected through a series of partial short-run 
adjustments. The VEC model in our case consists of a four-variable system (V, x, z, and r) 
with one cointegrating equation (based on results of cointegration tests reported in the 
following section) and lagged difference terms:   Shaik and Miljkovic  Farm Real Estate Values and Farm Program Payments   157 
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ary. Thus, the linear combination of four variables  111 1 () ttt t Vxzr        also must be 
stationary. In this model, the only right-hand-side variable is the error correction term which 
equals zero in long-run equilibrium. However, if V, x, z, and r deviate from the long-run 
equilibrium, the error correction term will be nonzero and each variable adjusts to partially 
restore equilibrium. Finally, the coefficient i measures the speed of adjustment of the ith 
endogenous variable toward equilibrium. 
 
U.S. Data and Tests of Unit Roots and Cointegration 
 
Farm returns and farm program payments are converted to a per acre basis using total farm 
acreage. The variables are then deflated using the gross domestic product implicit price 
deflator with 2000 as the base year. Annual total farm acreage represents all farm and ranch 
land including crop and livestock acreage, wasteland, woodland, pasture, land in summer 
fallow, idle cropland, and land enrolled in the Conservation Reserve Program, Wetland 
Reserve Program, and other set-aside or commodity acreage programs. Farm real estate value 
is measured by the value of all farm land and buildings. Farm receipts are the values of crop 
and livestock produced during a calendar year exclusive of farm program payments. Farm 
receipts are used as a proxy for farm returns because the correlation between the two 
variables is more than 90% (Shaik, Helmers, and Atwood, 2005). Farm program payments 
include all transfers except disaster payments and crop insurance indemnities. 
  The real interest rate is calculated by subtracting the rate of inflation (changes in the 
consumer price index) from the nominal interest rate collected from the Farm Credit System. 
Data on farm receipts, farm program payments, farm real estate values, and interest rates are 
available from the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) (online at http://www.ers.usda. 
gov/Data/farmincome/finfidmu.htm). Table 1 provides summary statistics. The average value 
of farm real estate for the period 1933–2006 is $743 per acre with a standard deviation of 
$342. The mean real interest rate for the same period is 3.6%. On average, U.S. agricultural 
producers received $173 per acre of gross farm receipts for the same period. The average 
farm program payment was $8.30 per acre with a standard deviation of $6.20. 
  The augmented Dickey-Fuller test (Dickey and Fuller, 1979) is used to test for 
the stationarity of farm real estate values, real interest rates, farm receipts, and farm program 158   April 2010  Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics 
 
 






















Mean 742.7  3.6  172.9  8.3 
Maximum 1,630.0  12.1  254.8  24.6 
Minimum 301.5  −3.7 61.8  1.0 
Standard Deviation  342.1  3.0  48.6  6.2 
Source: USDA data, available at http://www.ers.usda.gov/Data/farmincome/finfidmu.htm. 
 
payments.
5 We were unable to reject the null hypothesis of nonstationarity for farm receipts, 
farm real estate values, and real interest rates at either the 1% or 5% significance levels. 
However, the first differences of these variables are stationary. Finally, the lag length for each 
of the time series was determined based on the Schwarz information criterion (SIC). The 
optimal lag length is one for real interest rate and farm returns, and zero for farm program 
payment and farm real estate values. 
  We next test for cointegration of all four variables. The Granger representation theorem 
(Enders, 1995) asserts that for any set of I
 (1) variables, error correction and cointegration are 
equivalent representations. After establishing that all four time series under consideration are 
I
 (1), a cointegration analysis was conducted. The multivariate cointegration test (Johansen, 
1991, 1995) was carried out with one lag in differences. Based on the results of both trace 
statistics and maximum eigenvalue statistics, we conclude that the four variables have one 
cointegrating vector with p-values less than 0.01 (table 2). 
  Given the presence of unit roots and cointegrating vectors, we proceed with the vector 
error correction estimation. Model selection criteria for selecting optimal lag structures may 
not be appropriate for error correction analyses because of long-run adjustments (Hall, 1994). 
Hall suggested that a reasonable starting point would be the maximum number of lags based 
on economic theory, prior expectations, or common sense. One may then decrease the number 
of lags by simultaneously considering the model selection criteria and maintaining the 
original rationale (i.e., economic theory, prior expectations, or common sense) until the most 
satisfactory model is selected. Following this procedure, we start with a lag length of 5 in all 
equations because this spans the duration of most farm bill legislation. However, lags 3–5 
were insignificant both separately and jointly. A model using two lags was selected because it 
had the lowest SIC and Akaike information criterion (AIC) values. 
 
Results of the 
Vector Autoregressive Income Capitalization Model 
 
Before analyzing short-run parameter estimates from the vector error correction model, we 
test for long-run relationships among the variables. Specifically, the variables are tested 
for  weak exogeneity and speed of adjustment (Johansen and Juselius, 1994). With one 
cointegrating vector, the null hypothesis of weak exogeneity is H0: i,1 = 0 for all i, where i 
                                                 
5 Nonstationarity of real interest rates has been debated and rationalized by economists for decades. The true issue with the 
result is that it undermines the basis of the asset theory. Our result is consistent with most findings in the literature (e.g., Rose, 
1988; Rapach and Weber, 2004), and we use it in subsequent analysis. Shaik and Miljkovic  Farm Real Estate Values and Farm Program Payments   159 
 














Farm Real Estate Values I
 (1) 0  None  −2.559 0.011 
Real Interest Rates I
 (1) 1  Constant  −6.237 0.000 
Farm Returns I
 (1)  1  Constant and Trend  −6.761 0.000 
Farm Program Payment I
 (0)  0  Constant and Trend  −3.525 0.044 
 















Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test (Trace)
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Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test (Maximum Eigenvalue)
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a Lag length was automatically selected based on SIC. 
b MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values. 
c MacKinnon, Haug, and Michelis (1999) p-values. 
d Trace test indicates 1 cointegrating equation(s) at the 0.05 level. 
e Denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 0.05 level. 
f Max-eigenvalue test indicates 1 cointegrating equation(s) at the 0.05 level. 
 
represents farm real estate values, farm returns, real interest rates, and farm program pay-
ments. The tests are distributed as chi-squared with one degree of freedom and are reported in 
table 3. The null hypotheses of weak exogeneity are clearly rejected for farm real estate 
values, real interest rates, and farm program payments, while we cannot reject the null 
hypothesis that farm returns are weakly exogenous. Hence, in the long run, farm returns 
determine farm real estate values and farm program payments. 
  The vector error correction model is used to examine the dynamics of farm real estate 
values for the period 1933–2006. Estimated coefficients from the vector error correction 
model are presented in table 4. 
  Results indicate that lagged farm real estate values positively affect contemporaneous farm 
real estate values. This outcome is consistent with earlier research (e.g., Featherstone and 
Baker, 1987; Burt, 1986). Changes in real interest rates do not impact farm real estate values. 
Parameter estimates on farm returns and farm program payments show a positive and 
significant effect on farm real estate values. Thus, higher farm returns are expected to 
increase farm real estate values. 
  Farm program payments had a positive influence on farm real estate values even though 
the primary intent of farm program payments is to stabilize farm prices and incomes. This 
positive influence might be of consequence to new entrants to farming, and small and socially 
disadvantaged farmers who face higher farm real estate values.   160   April 2010  Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics 
 
 











 Cointegration restrictions  A(1,1) = 0  A(2,1) = 0  A(3,1) = 0  A
 (4,1) = 0 
 No. of iterations required to converge  10  9  22  12 
 LR test for binding restrictions (rank = 1) 
     
2
[1]   
      
5.15688 1.5837 17.19909 9.78289 
      Probability  0.02315  0.2082    0.00003 0.00176 
 









Farm Program  
Payments (z)  
Cointegration equation (1)      0.000375***    −0.000063      0.000016***       0.000046*** 
Diff (Vt−1) 0.5953***  0.0308  −0.0001  −0.0393*** 
Diff (Vt−2) 0.0186  −0.0250  −0.0057* 0.0124 
Diff (xt−1) 1.5364***  0.2488*  0.0015  −0.0583* 
Diff (xt−2) 0.2059  −0.3774*** 0.0090  0.0893** 
Diff (rt−1)  −6.3671  −1.0386 0.5231***  0.0059 
Diff (rt−2) 0.3350  −1.3394  −0.2777***  −0.2176 
Diff (zt−1) 3.9313***  −0.1614 0.0947***  0.0789 
Diff (zt−2) 1.0713  −0.7230 0.0882**  0.2633* 
Constant 2.6579  2.0699  −0.0337 0.4157 
R
2 0.6109  0.2133  0.5535  0.3667 
Adjusted R
2 0.5535  0.0972  0.4876  0.2732 
Sum of squared residuals  79,802  9,097  43  564 
S.E. equation  36.1694  12.2117  0.8424  3.0415 
F-statistic 10.6436  1.8378  8.4028  3.9243 
Log likelihood  −350.1  −273.0  −83.2  −174.3 
Akaike information criterion  10.1442  7.9725  2.6248  5.1925 
Schwarz information criterion  10.4629  8.2912  2.9435  5.5111 
Mean dependent  18.2417  2.0445  −0.0757 0.1196 
S.D. dependent  54.1320  12.8525  1.1769  3.5677 
Note: Single, double, and triple asterisks (*,**,***) denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
  Results from the farm returns equation indicate that lagged farm returns lead to higher 
current farm returns. The low explanatory power of this equation probably reflects the exclu-
sion of farm inputs in the models. 
  The farm program payment equation indicates that lagged farm program payments posi-
tively affect current payments. In addition, declining farm real estate values and lower farm 
returns lead to higher contemporaneous farm program payments. The countercyclical nature 
of farm program payments and farm returns has been suggested within static frameworks by 
Shaik, Atwood, and Helmers (2005) and is consistent with policies that stabilize farm prices 
and income. However, the positive coefficient estimate on the second lagged farm returns 
variable suggests higher farm returns would lead to higher current farm program payments. 
This positive coefficient of farm program payments may be self-perpetuating since legislation 
often covers multiple years.   Shaik and Miljkovic  Farm Real Estate Values and Farm Program Payments   161 
 
Impulse Response Functions 
 
We examine how a shock to the ith variable affects all the endogenous variables through the 
lag structure of the vector error correction model. As in traditional vector autoregressive 
analysis, Lutkepohl and Reimers (1992) showed that innovation accounting (i.e., impulse 
responses) in vector error correction can be used to obtain information concerning variable 
interactions. As a practical matter, the two innovations y,t and z,t may be contemporaneously 
correlated if yt has a contemporaneous effect on zt and/or zt has a contemporaneous effect on 
yt. In obtaining impulse response functions, Cholesky decomposition is used to orthogonalize 
the innovations. 
  Impulse responses are sensitive to the ordering of variables. Economic theory can some-
times assist in this ordering.
6 In this case, the farm income capitalization model suggests that 
variables be ordered as (a) farm real estate values, (b) farm returns, (c) farm program pay-
ments, and (d) real interest rates. This ordering reflects our desire to evaluate effects of 
shocks to farm returns and farm program payments on farm real estate values. Figure 1 traces 
the effects of one-unit shocks to all ’s on the time paths of farm real estate values, farm 
returns, farm program payments, and real interest rates. We are interested in the effects of 
one-unit shocks in z,t, x,t, and r,t on farm real estate values and of one unit-shocks in V,t 
and x,t on farm program payments.
7 
  All innovations are considered over a 20-year time frame. The most significant finding is 
that an innovation or shock to farm program payments has little impact on the long-run 
equilibrium path of farm real estate values. Specifically, changes in farm program payments 
do not affect the long-run equilibrium of farm real estate values. On the other hand, an 
increase in farm returns has a lasting, positive impact on farm real estate values. For example, 
if farm returns increase because of new technology (e.g., increased use of chemicals and 
capital in the 1940s and 1950s, or use of genetically modified seeds in the 1990s and 2000s), 
long-run farm real estate values increase over time relative to the equilibrium path based on 
the no-impact scenario. This finding is consistent with the capitalization model assumption 
that returns from farming activities are capitalized into farm real estate values. 
  Finally, a shock in real interest rates due to changes in macroeconomic or monetary policy 
leads to permanent changes in long-run farm real estate values. Again, after an adjustment 
period, farm real estate values stabilize at levels significantly above the original equilibrium 
path. Farm real estate values react to (independent) macroeconomic factors, while farm 
program payments may reflect policy makers’ reaction to low farm returns. A positive shock 
or change in farm returns leads to (permanently) lower government transfers to agriculture 
after a one- to two-year lag. On the other hand, a positive shock in farm real estate values 
leads to a swift response by government as evidenced by decreased farm program payments. 
However, government transfers exhibit a level of “stickiness” and increase over time, returning 
to the initial equilibrium path level.   
                                                 
6 Imposing a structure on a vector autoregressive system seems contrary to the spirit of Sims’ (1980, 1988) argument against 
“incredible identifying restriction.” Unfortunately, there is no simple way to circumvent the problem; identification necessitates 
imposing some structure on the system. The Cholesky decomposition provides a minimal set of assumptions that can be used to 
identify the primitive model. 
7 While the impact of shocks in model variables on farm returns is interesting, it may not be very informative considering that 
farm returns are very dependent on productivity. This, in turn, is influenced by changes in technology in the long run and farmers’ 
production decisions in the short run (Jorgenson and Stiroh, 2000; Stiroh, 2002; Miljkovic, Jin, and Paul, 2008). Again, these 
variables are not of interest in our policy/political economy framework and as such are not included here. However, the impulse 
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Figure 1. Impulse response functions to Cholesky one standard 
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  These results reveal three findings: (a) policy makers reduce government transfers when 
production agriculture is financially healthy, (b) farm real estate values may not be used by 
policy makers as a measure of the sector’s financial health, and (c) farm program payments 




We investigate the role of farm program payments and farm returns on farm real estate 
values. This research uses historical U.S. data from 1933–2006 to examine the dynamics of 
farm program payments, farm returns, real interest rates, and farm real estate values while 
accounting for endogeneity. 
  Our results reveal that policy makers are reactive, rather than proactive, in deciding to 
transfer income to farmers. Granger causality tests suggest that farm returns and farm real 
estate values Granger-cause farm program payments, while the opposite is not true. Exogen-
eity tests indicate that farm returns determine the long-run behavior of the other variables in 
the model. 
  Results from our VEC analysis show that farm returns have a negative effect on farm real 
estate values. Thus, one would expect government transfers to decline as farm returns and 
farm real estate values increase. Moreover, once farm program payments are implemented, 
they have positive impacts only in the short run (one year). Based on impulse response 
functions, program payments do not have a lasting impact on farm real estate values. Perhaps 
this finding is reasonable if policy makers intend to maintain incomes and lifestyles of rural 
Americans. However, farm real estate values are ultimately a function of farm returns. This 
result is consistent with the Lucas critique, which argues that traditional methods of policy 
evaluation do not adequately account for the impact of policy on expectations (Lucas, 1976). 
In this context, our results are in keeping with rational expectations that a government transfer 
in one year will likely be followed by similar payments in subsequent periods. Therefore, a 
payment in one year will have only a short-term impact on farm land value. 
  In contrast, a significant increase in farm program payments has a positive and lasting 
impact on farm returns. This finding also appears reasonable since an infusion of additional 
revenue may serve not only to bridge current liquidity problems, but also to modernize and 
adopt new technologies. This would lead to increased revenues in the long run. Finally, farm 
program payments have a positive indirect impact (via farm returns) on farm real estate 
values. 
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